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Anyone who wants to understand either the role that Rawls himself considered education to play within 
his political theory, or the most plausible philosophy of civic education that could be constructed with a 
Rawlsian political framework, must read M. Victoria Costa’s clear and compelling book, Rawls, 
Citizenship, and Education (Routledge, 2011).  Costa provides an indispensable synthetic roadmap to 
Rawls’ writings about social justice, education, and civic stability.  She shows how and why education of 
children is essential for the achievement and maintenance of a just state from a Rawlsian perspective.  
She discusses both the theoretical justifications for and the practical import of education in the context 
of families, schools, and political institutions themselves, exemplifying a welcome systemic approach to 
civic education.  In doing so, Costa tacks deftly between Rawls’ ideal theory and the non-ideal concerns 
that inevitably arise when one is considering contemporary policy questions. In this respect, as in many 
others, she is a supremely sympathetic but not deferential reader of Rawls.  It is a maddening fact of 
Rawls that he barely mentions either education or schools in his work, and when he does, he makes 
suggestions that seem at odds with other parts of his theory.  It would be easier if he had said nothing; 
then political theorists and philosophers of education could have constructed a plausible account on 
their own. Rawls, however, says just enough to stymie philosophers who want to develop a coherent 
and appealing Rawlsian theory of education.  Costa navigates these treacherous waters by sticking to 
Rawls as closely as she can, but also making additions—such as freedom as non-domination—and 
divergences—such as her acknowledgment that education is necessarily more than a minimal 
enterprise—as needed.  This approach is well considered, and positions Rawls, Citizenship, and 
Education as an important book in illuminating how political justifications can support a robust state-
sponsored program of civic education.   
Another welcome feature of Rawls, Citizenship, and Education is its ability to speak to both lay and 
expert audiences simultaneously.  Costa is a dedicated scholar of Rawls.  She summarizes and 
synthesizes his corpus in admirable fashion.  In so doing, she provides an accessible roadmap to his work 
for non-specialists.  Students and scholars in fields other than political theory can easily learn from Costa 
about the essential features of Rawls’ theory of justice, both in general and as it applies to education.  At 
the same time, Costa navigates the shifts between Rawls’ earlier and later works in a way that experts in 
the field will appreciate.  She is transparent about where her interpretations of Rawls converge with 
others’ and where and how they move in new directions.  She’s appropriately unapologetic about rising 
above the minutiae of competing Rawlsian interpretations in order to develop her own, original account 
of civic education within a Rawlsian framework.  
After offering a brief introduction in Ch. 1, Costa begins by summarizing Rawls’ theory of social justice in 
Chs. 2 and 3.  This is where she establishes herself as a highly sympathetic but not slavish follower of 
Rawls.  She addresses a number of critiques in order to hew closely to Rawls’ political theory. But she 
herself argues that his account of how states can achieve “a deep and widespread moral consensus on the principles of justice” through only minimal regulation of education “is too optimistic” and “needs to 
be supplemented by a more substantial account of the role of educational institutions” (p. 37).  This 
leads her in Ch. 4 to evaluate the family as an educative institution, as well as more generally as a 
component of the “basic structure” of society that is supposed to promote social justice.  Costa’s 
analysis is complex—even at times intellectually convoluted—as she tries to justify Rawls’ embrace of 
the family as a social institution that forms the basic structure of society despite the patently unjust 
dimensions of both intrafamily and interfamilial life.  Although she never directly says so, it appears from 
this chapter and Ch. 5, in which she directly addresses schools as educative institutions, that she wishes 
that Rawls had included schools in, and excluded families from, the basic structure.  Costa is too eager to 
remain an interpreter rather than a rewriter of Rawls to be so blunt about where he got his own theory 
wrong.  I am convinced by many of her arguments, however, that schools are necessary tools for 
achieving stable and just societies, and at least in an ideal context can be regulated so as to instantiate 
as well as to teach social justice, whereas families are likely both to instantiate and to exacerbate 
injustice even in ideal contexts, let alone in non-ideal worlds.   
In any case, Costa mostly confines her analysis to schools in the second half of the book, focusing 
especially on what kind of civic education is both necessary and sufficient to support social justice.  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 take up different aspects of the curriculum, beginning in Ch. 6 with the education of 
“free and equal citizens,” which she reinterprets as education for non-domination, or education against 
servility.  Costa argues that such an education aims to teach toleration, mutual respect, the burdens of 
judgment, and even mutually sympathetic analysis of diverse conceptions of the good.  I found Costa’s 
arguments in favor of this decidedly non-minimal curricular agenda generally convincing.  Ch. 7 rejects 
the idea that patriotic education, at least understood in a nationalist sense, is either necessary or 
desirable; instead, she argues in favor of teaching about the desirability of the principles of justice 
themselves.  These arguments reinforce the educational agenda she introduced in previous chapters, 
while also emphasizing the importance of teaching children about principles.  This chapter is the most 
convincing educational analysis in the book; not coincidentally, it also plunges most deeply into the 
details of educational practice and policy.  Ch. 8 argues in favor of multicultural education that teaches 
children to respect and accommodate not only competing comprehensive conceptions of the good but 
also multiple cultural and other expressions of diversity.  Again, this chapter expands upon some of her 
earlier points about the importance of teaching children to understand and analyze actual belief systems 
and ways of life, not just abstract notions of tolerance and mutual respect.  She then offers brief 
concluding remarks in Ch. 9. 
As I move from summary to critique, let me admit upfront that I am not a Rawlsian, and hence I find it 
somewhat difficult to assess the success of Costa’s interpretive enterprise.  For example, I believe that 
Rawls’ simplifying assumptions, which Costa does a nice job of teasing out, turn his ideal theory into an 
isolated edifice; it may be beautiful to look at, but it is far too removed from the challenges of 
contemporary societies to function as a guide for real-world action.  I also think that the fact that Rawls’ 
political justification of particular educational aims (e.g. teaching the burdens of judgment) in practice 
has substantive consequences for the kinds of comprehensive conceptions that children will be able to 
hold is in itself a central problem for Rawls’ theory (Levinson 1999).  Costa agrees that the educational “content” of justice as fairness is virtually indistinguishable from the educational content of perfectionist 
liberal theories.  “Rawls’ own attempts to distinguish his view from more comprehensive liberalisms by 
pointing to differences in educational policy fail” (p. 65).  She nonetheless argues that because “the sorts 
of arguments employed to justify” these educational consequences are different, a Rawlsian educational 
theory is more attractive and more stable, because it’s merely political, than is perfectionist liberal 
educational theory (p. 65).  I’m unconvinced.  I see no reason for parents to sign onto an educational 
program that will prevent their children from living lives they value just because the arguments in favor 
of this education are political rather than comprehensive.  On the flip side, if the Rawlsian educational 
program Costa lays out is successful, I don’t see how the distinction between political and 
comprehensive justifications will matter after the first generation.  All children who receive the full dose 
of Costa’s civic education curriculum will, if the curriculum works, grow up to be comprehensive liberals.   
If the curriculum doesn’t work, then even Rawls’ political liberal society is at risk from illiberal children-
turned-adults who reject its basic premises and threaten its stability.  In these respects, I am 
sympathetic to many of the critiques of Rawls that Costa attempts to counter in her book, and 
unconvinced by some of her responses. 
I don’t think it’s helpful to critique Costa’s fine book, however, from a standpoint that is profoundly 
skeptical of Rawls.  Her purpose is not to defend a Rawlsian theory of education against competing 
political theories of education, but instead to develop an attractive theory of education that is 
compatible with Rawlsian principles.  Given this, I will try in the rest of this review to evaluate Costa’s 
arguments on their own terms.  I will take her analysis of Rawls’ political theory as a given, and in 
general confine my assessment to the conclusions she draws about education.  There will be some 
moments when my critique of Costa has knock-on effects for Rawls’ theory itself—most notably with 
respect to Costa’s rather schizophrenic tack between ideal versus non-ideal theory.  I shall suggest this 
schizophrenia reveals a lack of clarity in Rawls’ own theory construction.  But for the most part, I will try 
to remain within a Rawlsian framework, as Costa herself does. 
I was both convinced and frustrated by many of the quite specific policy prescriptions that Costa derives 
from Rawls’ theory.  Costa herself seems to regard these prescriptions as some of the key contributions 
of the book, but I wish she spent more time fleshing them out both from a theoretical standpoint and 
with regard to their empirical implementation. 
At the end of Ch. 4, for example, Costa claims that “taking seriously the ideal of equal citizenship favors 
equalizing expenditure per student…Of course, some additional resources should be allocated to 
students with special needs, to compensate for disabilities or social disadvantages” (p. 54).  I am 
sympathetic to this policy stance, but she derives it astonishingly quickly, leaving aside enormous 
questions.  Most importantly, I’m curious whether she thinks that equal citizenship is satisfied truly by 
equal expenditures on each student (adjusting for special needs), or whether she in fact has in mind 
equal educational outcomes.  There is overwhelming data from the U.S. and abroad that schools and 
districts with equal levels of expenditures have vastly different but also highly predictable outcomes for 
their students, based on the incoming characteristics of students, the quality of teachers they are able 
to purchase (depending on rural versus suburban or urban location, competition with nearby districts, 
reputation, etc.), their educational priorities (academics vs. vocational education, test prep versus inquiry-based education, arts and music versus sports), and other factors.  In order to defend a policy of 
equal expenditures rather than equal outcomes, at least some of these differences must be acceptable 
sources of variation from Costa’s Rawlsian perspective.  I’d be curious which ones.  For example, is it 
okay for a child to be less likely to attend a selective college because her town democratically chose to 
spend money on refurbishing the football stadium rather than on hiring AP science teachers?  What 
about differences in educational outcomes that are attributable to peer effects?  Consider one child who 
is in a school that serves children who “do school” well, while another equally talented and motivated 
child attends a school that has a less stable student population who are also less academically 
successful.  Data clearly demonstrate that the first child is likely to have higher educational attainment 
than the second.  Are these unequal outcomes acceptable?  Given Costa’s embeddedness within 
Rawlsian theory, she has excellent reasons to resist an outcome-based funding scheme, but the policy 
prescriptions she derives are significantly undertheorized in response to real-world dilemmas.   
Furthermore, the mismatch between equal school funding and equal educational outcomes matters in 
particular for Rawls (and hence for Costa) because education is not only an absolute good but also a 
positional good (Nie et al. 1996).  Young people striving for many jobs now need a college degree not 
because the job itself demands college-level knowledge or skills, but because there’s a surfeit of 
applicants who can boast such a degree.  Access to powerful social and political networks is also 
increasingly predicated on relative educational attainment, with “mere” college graduates excluded 
from networks now accessible only through professional school attendance at selective institutions.  It’s 
not my purpose here to rehash the important educational equality versus adequacy debates of the past 
decade (Reich and Koski 2006; Anderson 2007; Satz 2007).  But I do want to point out why this question 
of whether equal educational expenditures or attainment is really what matters is of such significance to 
Costa’s account of Rawlsian education policy.  Costa notes that, “Rawls claims that equality in the rights 
and liberties of citizens is consistent with significant inequality in the resources citizens have….In order 
to challenge this claim, one would have to show that Rawls’ theory fails to protect in some important 
respect the status of citizens as free and equal.  One way to do this would be to try to show that the 
non-political basic liberties have some comparative or relational aspect in the same way that the 
political ones do: that one’s position relative to others is relevant in terms of the extent to which one 
can enjoy all the basic liberties characteristic of free citizens” (p. 77).  My contention is that educational 
attainment poses this exact challenge: one’s educational achievement relative to others indubitably 
influences the extent to which one can enjoy all the basic liberties characteristic of free citizens. 
On a different note with regard to equal educational expenditures, I’m curious what position Costa 
would take on the permissibility of voluntary educational expenditures by parents or local businesses 
that top up the otherwise equal funding a school or district receives from the state.  As Rob Reich has 
shown (Reich 2005), some districts in California are able to virtually double the average state per-pupil 
expenditure thanks to a wealthy parent donor base.  They use this money to fund science and arts 
teachers, field trips, reading specialists, clubs and teams, and all sorts of opportunities that children in 
poorer districts don’t receive.  Equal funding is hence honored only in the breach.  Furthermore, Reich 
has suggested that because such donations are legal, wealthy parents have little incentive to get 
involved politically to advocate for higher overall state funding for schools, thus exacerbating California’s precipitous educational collapse.  Given these considerations, do private donations to public schools 
violate equal citizenship?  If so, would Costa put a stop to such donations?  Answers to these questions 
also have to take into account the implications for families’ differential expenditures on enrichment 
opportunities at home.  It’s clear that neither Rawls nor Costa believes it would be appropriate for the 
state to interfere in families’ personal expenditures on their own children.  But then it would seem 
foolish to prohibit families’ expenditures on other people’s children.  Arguably, donations to the school 
equalize opportunity to some extent by giving all children at the school access to the educational goods 
and services, whereas private expenditures benefit only the family’s children themselves.  Costa may 
well reply that for precisely these reasons, she favors private donations to particular schools and 
districts—but that still leaves her policy prescriptions for “equal educational funding” in question when 
state expenditures on schools constitute only a fraction of total educational expenditures. 
Another question that I wish Costa had addressed is homeschooling.  Costa argues that while “a 
significant portion of a child’s education takes place in a family….an equally significant portion of a 
child’s education takes place in school, and this portion can be subject to public regulation and control 
without jeopardizing the important functions of families” (p. 52).  She relies on this latter fact to justify 
the inequities that result from family control as well as to justify the merely “threshold” expectations for 
the kind of civic education families should provide.  These arguments may be satisfactory if all children 
go to school.  But Costa is silent about whether or not school attendance should be required.  As of 
2007, about 1.5 million children in the U.S. were being homeschooled (U.S. Department of Education 
2009).  Should this be disallowed under a Rawlsian framework (see Reich 2002)?  If not, how can we be 
assured that children are being treated like equal citizens, or that citizens will grow up to support the 
principles of justice?   
Related questions beg to be addressed in her chapter on multicultural education.  Costa rightly, if 
relatively uncontroversially, comes out in favor of providing equal educational opportunities to minority 
children, and also to educating majority children about the virtues and contributions of minority 
cultures.  She contends that schools should make accommodations “so as to make students of different 
cultural backgrounds feel as welcome and as comfortable as possible” (p. 123); they should also teach a 
multicultural curriculum and even support bilingual education.  I am in favor of this as a matter of 
educational policy, but can’t imagine that Rawls’ ideal theory really supports getting in the weeds like 
this, nor do I think his theory automatically comes down on the side of lefty educational policies, as 
Costa continually seems to assume.  More to the point, Costa focuses on happy-feeling curricula while 
ignoring structural and institutional questions.  I am dying to know if Costa would support voluntary 
separate schools, and what her justifications for or against would be.  What if such schools 
demonstrably increased opportunity and reduce inequality? 
Costa’s policy prescriptions for how schools can help children resist domination are also attractive as far 
as they go, but cry out for further exploration.  Costa argues that while education for autonomy is 
controversial, “one can expect much wider agreement on the claim that domination is prima facie bad 
and that there are good reasons to avoid or prevent it….The reasonable expectation of widespread 
agreement regarding the badness of domination allows the case for the education for freedom as non-
domination to be framed within the boundaries of political justification,” and hence to find support in a Rawlsian theory (p. 86).  She argues that civic education can reduce citizens’ risk of being dominated 
both by spreading personal virtues “as aids to the rule of law” (p. 88) and by “encouraging children to 
think of themselves as equal to others and therefore entitled to respectful treatment” (p. 88).  She 
emphasizes that boys and girls of all ethnicities should be taught to view themselves as equals, and 
hence also “as entitled to form their own plans and to pursue them” (p. 90).  As with her other curricular 
recommendations, I embrace the content of these lessons.  I remain dubious, however, that the political 
(anti-domination) justification for this kind of education will be any more attractive to non-autonomy 
favoring parents and citizens than a perfectionist justification would be.   
Even if domination itself is widely agreed to be bad, I anticipate widespread contention over whether 
and how children should be taught to resist domination by adults.  Both schooling and family life are 
often predicated on adults’ domination of children.  Youth are absolutely not treated as deserving of 
respect equal to their teachers and parents; in fact, claims of equality or self-direction are treated as 
threatening the very core of the educational and child-rearing enterprises (I discuss this in Levinson 
2012: Ch. 5).  To take one recent example, the 2012 Texas Republican Party platform includes the 
following plank: “We oppose the teaching of Higher Order Thinking Skills (HOTS) (values clarification), 
critical thinking skills and similar programs that are simply a relabeling of Outcome-Based Education 
(OBE) (mastery learning) which focus on behavior modification and have the purpose of challenging the 
student's fixed beliefs and undermining parental authority” (Republican Party of Texas 2012).  While 
many on the left (or living on the coasts) may deride Texas Republicans as backwards reactionaries, it’s 
important to recognize that even the most progressive parents and educators who believe that young 
people should be encouraged to think of themselves as equals entitled to respect likely still end up 
dominating  children “for their own good” on a frequent basis.  Costa’s definition of domination, 
following Philip Pettit, specifies that it exists “whenever one agent has the capacity to interfere at will 
and with impunity in some of the choices and actions of another” (p. 87).  This structural relationship 
clearly pertains to adults and children both in the home and at school—and it pertains in Ann Arbor and 
Palo Alto as much as in Dallas or Lubbock. 
Finally, I want to address Costa’s decision to move back and forth between ideal and non-ideal theory in 
developing her account of Rawlsian education policies.  The task that Costa set herself is to determine 
the contours of education policy that is compatible with—and even helps to realize—Rawlsian 
principles.  But Rawls’ theory specifically discourages the derivation of policy implications as such.  Rawls 
himself insists that his theory is about the “basic structure” of society alone, not about specific 
arrangements that may be made in particular societies with respect to tax systems, particular market 
regulations, and the like.  Furthermore, because Rawls’ theory is constructed within an ideal frame, 
buttressed by a number of simplifying assumptions, it has a very imperfect match with any real-world 
contexts in which one would set policy.  Costa herself emphasizes in the first half of the book that all of 
the elements of the basic structure are designed to work together to promote justice as fairness.  A full 
and equal complement of political rights, for example, may do little to advance justice if access to the 
powers and prerogatives of offices and social bases of self-respect, say, are unfairly distributed.  From 
this perspective, whether or not schools should truly be considered (contra Rawls) as part of the basic 
structure of society, their roles and what they teach should be analyzed solely in light of other institutions’ functioning appropriately and in line with the demands of justice.  Costa occasionally 
confines her educational analysis to such fully ideal settings.  But she rightly finds these restrictions 
unsatisfying.  Hence, Costa often finds herself in the awkward position of trying to derive from Rawls’ 
ideal theory specific educational policy recommendations—about the content of civic education, say, or 
the kinds of accommodations that should be made for cultural minorities—for a non-ideal context, 
reflective of at least some aspects of the real work in which we live, in which the basic structure of 
society does not align with the demands of justice as fairness.  This leads to some of the intellectual 
contortions I alluded to above—and which leave me wondering whether we’d be better off starting 
from non-ideal theory in the first place. 
Costa’s inclination toward non-ideal theorizing is understandable with regard not only to the non-ideal 
context of any policy prescriptions, but especially to the special challenge posed by children. Children’s 
upbringing is particularly difficult to address in ideal theory because they are decidedly non-ideal beings.  
They haven’t already accepted the burdens of judgment (these burdens don’t even make sense to them 
for many years), or agreed to live in harmony with others.  They often behave unreasonably and even 
irrationally, and they are easily induced by those they love to embrace beliefs and ways of life that are 
nonsensical and threatening to outsiders.  Especially if it is acknowledged that they may be raised in 
families that are out of accord with liberal political principles, they are truly “strangers in a strange land” 
whose non-ideal presence necessarily intrudes upon the ideal world.  These characteristics of children 
perhaps explain why Rawls spends so little time addressing them in his theory—although of course even 
his most ideal society requires a constant influx of children for its perpetuation.  In Rawls, Citizenship, 
and Education, Costa admirably strives to address children’s presence within a(n imperfectly) just world, 
and to explore what it would take to equip them to foster a Rawlsian conception of justice themselves.  
Even when her answers and approaches diverge from Rawls’ own, she provides a thoughtful and 
compelling roadmap to education in service of civic equality and the achievement of a more just society. 
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